New Media Technology Essay Example for Free

New Media Technology Essay Tim Berners-Lee, the creator of the worldwide web, initially intended his invention to be a haven of collaboration where people could share their knowledge (Gauntlett 2009:39). Although the prospect of such public journalism corresponded with democratic and egalitarian principles, journalists took this idea with a pinch of salt. This was almost 20 years ago, before the information highway had, for better or for worse, stretched its limbs across the globe. Today, the new media has redefined both journalism and self expression in conflicting ways that leave an individual wondering at the veracity of digital information. In the last decade, internet has gone through an explosive growth and diversification. No one could have foreseen how the internet would pervade our lives and transform the very notion of being part of a society. It has provided the ultimate freedom of the new age: a single blogger can speak to the entire world, a concept virtually impossible two decades ago. However, with this flourishing and unbound growth, the internet brings a unique set of predicaments and dilemmas. The most profound and relevant of such problems is the age-old clash of a person’s right of self-expression with the hazards of misinformation of the whole society. Whether this deceit comes about due to ignorance or design is irrelevant; in a society that promotes freedom of speech, misinformation is bound to occur on both grounds. While conferring infinite freedom to the common person, this means of self-expression comes with the acrid realization that words from a layman, presented as the predominating views of his community, are not necessarily a blessing. The news on the new media of today is more about gossip and entertainment then first-rate journalism. Since when did journalism begin to cater to the ever-growing need of the populace to be entertained? In an interview to BBC World News America, Ted Koppel, former Nightline presenter, criticized the digital journalist of today for being a mere supplier for consumers (Whitlock 2010). The commercial expansion of new media and ever-growing competition in the free market means that journalists have to write what sells; or rather, gets the most â€Å"hits† on a website. How did we come to a situation where the populace demands not to be informed, but to be perpetually entertained? Discussing news on the television, Daya Kishan Thussu (2007: 9) states: â€Å"There is a concern that too much news is creating an information overload, contributing to a structural erosion of the public sphere in the Habermasian sense, where the viewer, bombarded with visuals, is unable to differentiate between public information and corporate propaganda. † If that is true regarding television news, it most definitely holds water concerning internet news. The gargantuan flow of information, most of which lacks in credibility, is bombarded on any user who wades through the mire of pop up advertisements, banners, and mass e-mailing. Although, these devices are some of the tools used in the race to get more traffic on ones website, the capitalist agenda is far from being the most unfavorable feature of journalism. It is the ubiquitous use of new media, especially by the youth that yields the most detrimental effects. The frivolous writing that is spilt across the new media today may be the first literature some of us encounter, and draw heavily from. However, there have been examples of the internet doing its job where other media have failed. Earlier this year, on January 12th, an earthquake hit the Caribbean island of Haiti. All landlines and mobile connections were suspended. The production team of the news program Sunrise at Sky News, London, was finding it difficult to channel in the first reports from the disaster-struck area. It was to be a young member of their team, Emily Purser, who used Twitter and instant messaging via Google and Skype, to secure the first reports of the incident (Elward 2010). Another, much publicized affair was the use of Twitter by the political opposition in Iran to protest the presidential elections. The protestants took to all sorts of media, but the loudest dissent was voiced, surprisingly, through microblogging. This medium proved to be fast, portable, and most importantly very difficult to contain. Ironically, this very accessibility makes the medium too erratic, unreliable, and mundane to be of any journalistic value (Grossman 2009). An obvious embodiment of the debate between free speech and quality journalism is Wikipedia. This resource epitomizes the â€Å"by the people, for the people† ideology, but this trait alone does not give it any credibility whatsoever, at least not in academic circles. A former editor-in-chief of Encyclopedia Britannica compared Wikipedia to a â€Å"public toilet†, accusing it of delivering information that has no authenticity (Shirky 2006). On the other hand, notions that anything that appears in print media will always be more accurate than digital information are absurd. What Wikipedia envisions is the process through which one can witness the knowledge of its users evolving and perfecting itself through countless revisions (Shirky 2006). The trump card in the argument for Wikipedia comes from a comparison of veracity of data between itself and Britannica; the scientific journal Nature declares them to be of similar accuracy (Giles 2005:900). This collaboration is a sign for those who think people are becoming ever more antisocial and misanthropic, for this is a global effort in creating something for the benefit of all and no monetary gain (Gauntlett 2009:42) . Patricia Wallace, in her book, The Psychology of the Internet writes about how free flow of information can be used to cultivate critical and analytical thinking amongst students who access it (1999:245). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the new media is losing credibility day by day. Although, the global sharing of information and its revision by collaboration is a noble idea, public journalism makes it exceedingly difficult to acquire accurate information; and to accept the new media as a genuine journalistic medium. BIBLIOGRAPHY Gauntlet, David. (2009). Case Study: Wikipedia. Eds. Creeber, G Martin, R. Digital Cultures. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill. Thussu, Daya Kishan. (2007). News as Entertainment: The Rise of Global Infotainment. London: SAGE Publications. Wallace, Patricia. (1999). The Psychology of The Internet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shirky, Clay. Interviewed on Imagine, BBC1, UK (aired 5th December 2006) Giles, Jim. (2005). Internet encyclopedias go head to head, Nature, 438:900. www. nature. com/nature/journal/v438/n7070/full/438900a. html (5th May, 2010) Grossman, Lev. (2009). Iran Protests: Twitter, the Medium of the Movement. Time. http://www. time. com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00. html (5th May, 2010) Whitlock, Scott. (2010). Ted Koppel Slams Undisciplined Internet Journalism. NewsBusters. http://newsbusters. org/blogs/scott-whitlock/2010/04/13/ted-koppel-slams-undisciplined-internet-journalism-longs-good-old-da (5th May, 2010) Elward, David. (2010) Work of a trainee newspaper journalist. (5th May, 2010) http://davidelward. com/2010/03/09/the-digital-revolution-need-not-sound-the-death-knell-for-good-journalism/

The Use of Digital Cameras :: Expository Essays Research Papers

The Use of Digital Cameras Digital cameras allow computer users to take pictures and store the photographed images digitally instead of on traditional film. With some digital cameras, a user downloads the stored pictures from the digital camera using special software included with the camera. With others, the camera stores the pictures on a floppy disk or on a PC Card. A user then copies the pictures to a computer by inserting the floppy disk into a disk drive or the PC Card into a PC Card slot (Chambers and Norton 134). Once stored on a computer, the pictures can be edited with photo-editing software, printed, faxed, sent via electronic mail, included in another document, or, posted to a Web site for everyone to see. Three basic types of digital cameras are studio cameras, field cameras, and point-and-shoot cameras (Shelly Cashman Series ® Microsoft Word 2000 Project 2). The most expensive and highest quality of the three, a studio camera, is a stationary camera used for professional studio work. Photojournalists frequently use field cameras because they are portable and have a variety of lenses and other attachments. As with the studio camera, a field camera can be quite expensive. Reliable and lightweight, the point-and-shoot camera provides acceptable quality photographic images for the home or small business user. A point-and-shoot camera enables the users to add pictures to personalized greeting cards, a computerized photo album, a family newsletter, certificates, awards, or a personal Web site. Because of its functionality, it is ideal camera for mobile users such as a real estate agents, insurance agents, and general contractors. The image quality produced by a digital camera is measured by the number of bits it stores in a dot and the resolution, or number of dots per inch. The higher each number, the better the quality, but the more expensive the camera. Most of today’s point-and-shoot cameras are at least 24-bit with a resolution ranging from 640 x 480 to 1024 x 960 (Walker 57-89).

On the Problem of Induction

A Critique of Nelson Goodman’s Concept of the New Riddle of InductionThe development of the method of induction has been privy to the presentation and solution of riddles. At the initial level of its development, it has been privy to the old riddle of induction discovered by Hume. After the solution of the former riddle, however, a new riddle of induction was discovered by Nelson Goodman. In lieu of this, this paper opts to consider the development of the method of induction as a methodology defined by Hume and Goodman’s conception of the Inductive method.Induction refers to â€Å"a method of reasoning by which a general law or principle is inferred from observed particular instances† (Flew 171). The method of inductive inference may be considered as the primary means through which justifications are formulated to show the relationship of evidence towards particular assumptions (Norton 2). The process of induction, in this sense, may be seen to arise whenever we note that evidence lends support to a hypothesis while in the process failing to establish its deductive certainty. It was such a formulation of the method of induction that enabled the conception of the first riddle. What follows is a presentation of the main arguments of the aforementioned riddle as formulated by David Hume.Hume argued that since no necessary connections exists between empirical phenomena, it is always possible that a future observation will prove our inferences wrong no matter how appealing it may have been or how richly supported by past observations. This problem, in the more recent formulations of the problem has been referred to as the uniformity principle [in this sense the lack of such uniformity]. According to the argument, nature has no uniformity. If such is the case it thereby follows that there is no voucher that which ensure the consistency of man’s most refined predictions. It might be argued that such an assumption has never been denied in th e formulation of predictions however there has been agreement regarding the results of such an agreement [or lack thereof] within the province of induction.To some, it means that induction is never valid or justified, while to others, it means that induction simply calls for different standards of validity (Landesman 164). The latter view strips the aforementioned riddle [Humean riddle] of its problematic context. This is evident if one considers that since the rules of deductive validity are inapplicable to induction, it cannot be a problem that inductive inference is unavoidably attended by the possibility that a future observation may prove it wrong (Goodman 4). The old riddle is then dismissed because it cannot possibly be the genuine problem of induction.Fact, Fiction, and Forecast present Goodman’s construal of what he refers to as the new riddle of induction. After refuting the old riddle of induction [the refutation of which is evident in the former paragraph], Goodma n proceeds to outline what he takes to be the genuine problem of induction and its tentative solution. The problem of induction, he writes, is a problem of demonstrating the difference between valid and invalid predictions (Goodman 4). According to Goodman, a prediction is valid if it conforms to a valid rule of induction, and a rule is valid if it yields valid predictions.He acknowledges that such an assumption is characterized by circularity however he notes that it is important to perceive such a conception of the problem in terms of the conceptions of justifications for arguments.   Goodman notes that inductive predictions based on past regularities work better than those based on any other alternative. If such is the case, the rules for formulating predictions must be constructed in such a way that they will coincide with common practices of inductive reasoning.This, on the other hand, is further developed by the quality of predictions, which it produces. This is clearly expl icated by Rubenstein as he notes, â€Å"the centerpiece of a valid inductive logic [according to Goodman] is its reliance on past regularities, and the prescriptive mandate of inductive validity is inseparable from a descriptive account of how inductive judgments are commonly made† (39). This has been the result of Goodman’s dissolution of the old riddle of induction. What follows this is Goodman’s explication that the most promising solution of the aforementioned riddle is untenable. It is through the introduction of such untenability that Goodman presents what he perceives to be the new riddle of induction.Goodman presents two hypotheses that are to be addressed through the use of the inductive method. One says that all emeralds are green and the other says that all emeralds are grue, where grue is said to apply to all things examined before t just in case they are green but to other things just in case they are blue (Goodman 10). Both hypotheses seem to be eq ually well supported by the evidence: all emeralds examined prior to t have been found to be green and grue. However, the two hypotheses are mutually exclusive. If emeralds are grue, they will be blue at t and thereafter, but if the alternative hypothesis is correct, they will be green. Thus, we are left with the paradox that Goodman christened the ‘new riddle of induction'.We cannot, after all, justify induction by appealing to past regularities. However, the reason, according to Goodman, is not the lack of the elusive uniformity principle, but the previously unrecognized ubiquity of regularities.   According to Goodman, regularities exist where one finds them. In relation to this Goodman states that one, however, finds them everywhere (12). If such is the case, it therefore follows that it is useless to base inductive validity on past regularities since it is not possible to predict and hence distinguish which regularities are valid and invalid.At this point, I would like to present a summary of the aforementioned discussion. In the aforementioned discussion, Goodman believes that the old riddle [the Humean riddle/the uniformity principle] has been dissolved and that induction is justified by past regularities. The only remaining difficulty he sees, however, lies in finding a rule for distinguishing between regularities that do and do not yield valid inductive predictions. As was noted in the above discussion, the possibility of such is not possible. This is evident if one considers that regularity necessitates the occurrence of acts of inductive inference. Therefore, the genuine problem of induction cannot be the distinction between the distinction of regularities that do or do not yield valid inductive predictions since the specification of such necessitates the formulation of inductive inferences.As I reckon, Goodman aforementioned conception fails to account for the process of induction. It is important to note that Goodman contends that inductio n begins with regularity. Rubenstein notes, â€Å"induction does not begin with regularity – it ends with it† (44). The failure to consider this leads Goodman to misconstrue the problem of induction. It is important to note that experience of reality does not necessarily start with regularities but rather with individual observations. The role of induction, in this sense lies in providing us with justified methods that allows us to posit the observations that we will account for as regularities. Goodman, however, failed to account for this.In addition to this, it is important to note that such a failure can also be traced to Goodman’s assumptions regarding the process in which individuals formulate inferences. Goodman's error is compounded when he makes a distinction between identifying regularity and projecting it. Once we have decided that our observations represent regularity, it is automatically projected in both temporal directions. This is, in fact, what w e mean by applying the term regularity to our data.Furthermore, Stich and Nisbett contend that the â€Å"equilibrium with inductive practices† that Goodman posited as a necessary aspect in formulating a valid inductive methodology is â€Å"neither necessary nor sufficient for a rule of inductive inference to be justified† (194). They argue that such an assumption fails to consider that â€Å"human subjects regularly and systematically make invalid inferences† and that there an instance wherein human reasoning enables an individual to â€Å"accept invalid rules and reject valid one’s that ought to govern the inference at hand† (Stitch and Nisbett 194).In summary, the aforementioned paper presented Goodman’s arguments in relation to his conception of the new riddle in induction. Such a riddle, however, under scrutiny may be seen as based upon a mistaken assumption of the justification process of beliefs that necessitates the introduction of in formation garnered through the method of induction. This is evident, for example, if one considers the manner in which observations enable the formulation of regularities and not the other way around. An analysis of Goodman’s supposed riddle of induction thereby leaves the reader wondering if such a riddle may be considered as a valid concern for the adherents of the inductive methodology.Works CitedFlew, Anthony.   A Dictionary of Philosophy.   London: Pan Books, 1983.Goodman, Nelson.   Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.   Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 1983.Landesman, Charles.  Ã‚   Skepticism: The Central Issues.   London: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.Rubenstein, Arthur.   â€Å"Induction, Grue Emeralds and Lady Macbeth’s Fallacy.†Ã‚   The Philosophical Quarterly 48.190 (Jan. 1998): 37-49.Stitch, Stephen and Richard Nisbett.   â€Å"Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning.’   Philosophy of Science 47.2 (Jun. 1980): 188- 202.

The Dinosaurs and Prehistoric Animals of Rhode Island